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This article has been first published under the title “Some Ideas about Empires on
Europe’s Periphery (The Worlds the Portuguese, the Russians, and the Turks Created)” in
the Russian journal Social Evolution and History (Volgograd, Uchitel), VI (1), March 2007:
146-154. Lusotopie thanks Social Evolution and History for permission.
1 The  reigning  confusion  in  the  attempts  to  theorize  empires  stems  from
overgeneralization.  Empires  are  simply  the  medium-run  successful  result  of  power
strategy which Giovanni Arrighi (1994) called territorialism. This strategy was typically
pursued in past epochs by agrarian-coercive apparatuses, otherwise called patrimonial or
pre-modern states.  The  main  story  during  the  ‘Long  Sixteenth  Century’  (in  Fernand
Braudel’s estimate, roughly from 1450 to 1650) was not the emergence of capitalism but
rather  the  successful  expansion  of  updated  agrarian-coercive  states,  or  in  William
McNeill’s expression the gunpowder empires (1989),  across the central zones of Afro-
Eurasian ecumene, from the Sea of Japan all the way to the Iberian peninsula in the West.
Among  these  new  monsters  were  the  territorial  entities  built  by  the  Portuguese,
Muscovite  Russians,  and  the  Ottoman  Turks.  After  the  foundational  periods  of  epic
success, all three empires became among the first to come under the pressure of another
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species in the evolution of social power – the capitalist organizations of Western Europe.
Ever since then, all three imperial trajectories have been developing largely in response
to the expansion of the capitalist networks of trade, innovation, and geopolitics. During
this period, Portugal, Turkey, and Russia experienced many similar dilemmas, deployed
similar strategies, and went through roughly similar phases of crisis and adaptation.
2 All three territorialist power organizations (i. e. empires) first tried to fall back on their
original glorious models, which after periods of crisis they had to dump more or less
violently and instead embrace imitative absolutist reforms; all three to various degree of
success tried to profit from the nineteenth-century capitalist globalization; and all three
tried to prove their worth by engaging in the First World War.  Since the late 1920s,
Portugal,  Russia,  and  Turkey  pursued  the  strategies  of  autarchy  and  dictatorial
modernization. All three former imperial states eventually tried to trade their redundant
geopolitical status for the admission into the capitalist European Union. Their former
imperial possessions, however, slid mostly into the periphery.
3 I. In materialist terms, empires might be better conceptualized as large power platforms.
Their geopolitical and ideological morphology derived from the strategy of territorial
control  over  tributary  populations  (Arrighi  1994;  Collins  1999).  Their  socioeconomic
metabolism was coercive redistribution (Polanyi  1968)  of  staple  finance which,  in an
evolutionary trend,  tended to be replaced by the monetized forms of  wealth finance
(Johnson & Earle 2000).
4 II. The historical recurrence of imperial form cannot be isolated from the evolutionary
diversity of chiefdoms and states (Johnson & Earle 2000). The larger supra-state units
commonly called empires, periodically emerged from the clusters of states found across
Afroeurasia as well as the pre-contact Americas. Following the geopolitical regularities of
overextension and the emergence of  dangerous marchlanders  (Collins  1999),  empires
could collapse back into warring states and chiefdoms. 
5 III. The sharp dichotomy between empires and nation-states based on the opposition of
autocracy versus democratic citizenship, however, is an ideological artifact. Analytically,
we might still wish to keep the traditional agrarian-coercive empires separate from the
modern  colonial empires  whose  governing  logic  was  capitalist  (Wallerstein  1989).
Empirically, such separation appears more difficult. Until quite recent times, the modern
capitalist agencies in the peripheral zone could enjoy the advantage of skimming profits
from the globally-extended political economy superimposed upon the local subsistence
economies without incurring the full costs of political control and social (and ecological)
reproduction.  The  Netherlands,  England,  or  France  were  capitalist  nation-states  in
Europe – while at the same time operating overseas as territorialist  empires (Arrighi
1994).  Take the English East  India Company that had inherited from the Mughals an
extensive ‘root system’ for collecting agrarian tribute. 
6 IV. In world-historical perspective (Braudel 1981–1984; McNeill 1989), we must recognize
that, in fact, the so-called Long Sixteenth Century (the 1450s–1640s) was the founding
epoch of massive agrarian-coercive empires. Capitalism so far remained limited to the
part of Western Europe which only eventually would become the core of modern world-
system. Elsewhere, the main story of the epoch was the growth of Ming and Manchu
empire in China; Japan’s consolidation resulting in the Tokugawa shogunate; the Mughal
conquest of north-central India; the Shia Islamic reformulation of Iranian state under the
Safavis; the rebirth of eastern Roman Empire/Byzantium under the Ottoman sultans; the
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completion of Iberian Catholic reconquista; or the geopolitical breakthrough achieved by
Muscovy in the challenging northern zone hitherto barely controlled by any state. 
7 V. The near simultaneous arrival of these empires was evidently related to the military
revolution of gunpowder and new infantry (McNeill 1984; Tilly 1992). The trademark of
new statehood were the arquebuseiros, Russian streltsy, or Turkish janissaries, or yeni cheri
– literally,  the new infantry. But the new imperial organization also marked the high
point in the evolution of other ‘sources of social power’ (Mann 1986) such as imperial
ideology  (better  called  the  world-imperial  religions),  state-regulated  trade,  and
bureaucratic organization.  The result was an awesome geographical  extent and sheer
concentration of power in the hands of rulers. Hardly by coincidence, among the most
familiar faces of the epoch we find the religious despots like Lord Hideyoshi, shah Ismail
Safavi, sultan Selim the Grim, Carlos V and Philippe II, Ivan the Terrible, or Aurangzeb
who attempted to roll back the official tolerance of earlier Mughals. 
 
Origin and Evolution of Portuguese, Ottoman and
Russian empires
8 I. The  origins  of  Portuguese,  Ottoman,  and Russian empires  pre-date  the  triumph of
European capitalism.  Subsequently  they have long existed alongside capitalism while
being increasingly penetrated and incorporated into the global capitalist  networks.  A
systematic comparison of three empires might illuminate the formative processes of our
world  while  keeping  our  analyses  on  firmer  grounds  than  the  notions  of  cultural
specificity.
9 II. The fall of Constantinople in 1453, the racketeering naval domination established in
the Indian ocean by the navies of Vasco da Gama and Affonso de Albuquerque in the early
1500s, or the Muscovite forceful extension of Russian heartland into the Great Steppe and
Siberia  in  the  1550s–1640s  were  all  the  triumphs  of  superior  guns.  The  geopolitical
vectors of three empires were pre-determined by the combinations of traditional trade
and migration networks with the ideologically construed horizons. All three began as
minor  marchlander  states  aggressively  expanding,  respectively,  from  the  interior  of
Anatolia into the areas long unified and exploited by the Romans and Arabs; from the
marginal  status of  the ‘Atlantic balcony’  proceeding by a daringly inventive route to
connect with the fabled markets of the East; and by following in reverse direction the old
pathways of nomadic migrations and attacks all the way back to Mongolia. The tribute
acquired through successful expansion fed the imperial grandeur and helped to establish
powerful states.
10 III. Portugal, for the obvious reasons of geographical and cultural proximity, was the first
to succumb to the Atlantic capitalism. Condemning in the 1540s the moral corruption and
hedonism of his times, a Portuguese Catholic polemicist bitterly observed: “Lisbon is just
the mouth gobbling the riches of the Indies; but the stomach is in the Flanders” (Godinho
1962: 173). In fact, the maritime expansion of Portugal (as well as Spain) from the outset
was  financed  by  the  cosmopolitan  diaspora  of  Genoese  bankers  (Arrighi  1994).
Subsequently Portugal, which was never a significant military power, fell into the durable
pattern  of  dependency.  After  regaining  sovereignty  from  Spain  in  1640,  Portugal
essentially leased its impossibly far-flung imperial possessions to the English in exchange
for protection and a junior share of profits. Portugal’s turn to show some assertiveness
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would not arrive until the British Empire entered its own terminal crisis in the 1930s
(Anderson 1974).
11 IV. By contrast, Turkey and Russia, both being massive land-based empires and so far less
dependent financially, could afford a considerably higher degree of resilience. Already in
the 17th century both states felt beleaguered by the capitalist West in trade and military
technology as  well  as  ideologically.  Their  first  response,  not  unlike other empires in
comparable situations, was the conservative reaffirmation of Islamic caliphate ideology
by the Ottoman rulers and the Orthodox Church reform in Muscovy. This went along with
the attempts to harshly control all communications with the West. 
12 V. Still,  the  gap  in  military  capacity  vis-à-vis  the  capitalist  West  grew  threatening.
Russian monarchy under Peter I (1690s-1720s) became the first to attempt the emulative
absolutist  reforms.  The state had to be split  from the top in order to use the newly
reformed part to cruelly suppress the resistances of old military and political elites: the
streltsy  were  executed,  the  church  lost  autonomy,  the  new  Westernized  gentry  was
implanted over the heads old nobility, not to mention the move of imperial capital to the
Baltic swamplands. The pattern of splitting the Russian state in order to use one part as
lever against the other would reemerge again in the revolution and Civil war of 1917-1920
and during Gorbachev’s perestroika in 1985–1991. Portugal in the mid-eighteenth century
registered a similar albeit less ambitious bout of absolutist reforms under Marquis de
Pombal. The Turks would take another century to begin catching up after the Tanzimat
decrees of the 1830s. 
13 VI. The further and arguably the biggest achievement of tsar Peter’s reform was at the
Turkish expense. During the 18th century new Russian armies eliminated the perennial
threat of the Crimean Tatar slave raiding and opened northern access to the Black sea.
This military advance secured one of the richest agricultural landscapes in the world:
Novorossiya (New Russia,  today mostly  in Ukraine).  What  followed was the grandest
feudal colonization in history which accorded to the reign of tsarina Catherine II the title
of the Golden Age of Nobility (Anderson 1974). The Turks, in the meantime, were paying
the  price  of  their  past  imperial  grandeur  – the  accumulated  weight  of  the  Ottoman
institutions  and  official  ideology  delayed  Westernizing  reforms.  The  realm  nearly
disintegrated  into  provincial  chiefdoms  which  greatly  facilitated  the  penetration  of
Western capitalist trade. 
14 VII. Coercion  was,  of  course,  integral  to  agrarian  empires  which  were,  in  the  main,
siphons for sucking tribute (Stavrianos 1982). Yet there also seems to be a lot to the old
argument that coercive intensification of peripheral agriculture developed in response to
the external capitalist pressures.  Historians subjected this argument to two empirical
criticisms doubting, first, the uniformity of increases in the expropriation of rural labor
and, secondly, demanding to show the causal mechanism leading to such outcome. This
debate can be better focused if not settled by introducing two variables: the effectiveness
of coercion and the relative commercialization that in the past very much depended on
the maritime access to market profits from agricultural exports and the importation of
luxury  goods  for  the  elite  status  consumption.  On  a  balance,  the  effective  reach  of
coercion seems the highest across the vast Russian countryside, but it could be more
concentrated in the disparate locations where the Portuguese maintained their  slave
plantations,  with  the  Ottoman  realm  showing  the  greatest  regional  and  temporal
disparities.  Overall,  the resulting trend applied to all  three empires.  Their balance of
payments suffered from unequal exchange in the external markets which none of them
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could  control.  The  imperial  realms  were  drained  of  investment  capitals  and
entrepreneurial potential for the economic activities other than coercive agriculture and
most basic local crafts. In sum, this trend is called underdevelopment. In the meantime,
let us note, the traditional imperial strategy of overcoming ‘decline’ – namely, territorial
conquest –  was  now  checked  by  the  geopolitical  competition  of  Western  industrial
imperialists. (Only the Russians in the 19th century continued to expand, with rapidly
decreasing  returns,  into  the  harsh  landscapes  of  the  Caucasus  and  Turkistan.  The
Portuguese  claims  to  the  interior  of  Africa  would remain nominal  and thus  entirely
unprofitable until the mid-twentieth century.
15 VIII. The three far-flung imperial realms contained a lot of geographic ‘friction’ which
was poorly mitigated by the existing communications (Harvey 2003). For this reason they
remained  polyglot  and  divided  into  numerous  communities  with  distinct  social
institutions and practices. Put differently, the imperial states remained un-national. This
statement, however, sounds too sweeping to be a meaningful theoretical generalization.
It  ignores  the fact  that  old  empires,  even such splendid as  the Roman and Chinese,
neither needed nor could afford the intensity of state and market penetration which
would culturally homogenize their populations. This does not mean that empires did not
pursue  their  own  strategies  of  homogenization.  One  was  the  alliance-building
(inseparable from more or less coercive supervision) among the locally ruling elites. Like
virtually  all  states  before  the  advent  of  modern  bureaucracy  and  instantaneous
communications, empires had to rule through the chains of local notables, priests, and
other  intermediaries  (Tilly  1992).  The  elements  within  these  chains,  however,  were
unified by the hegemonic imperial culture, not least of all the palace culture much of
which (palace music, painting, or cuisine) in retrospect would be presented as distinct
civilizations. This strength of elite homogenization corresponded quite directly to the
prestige of empire eliciting from the provincials the desire to emulate the prestigious
lifestyles.  This cultural strength, in turn, directly flowed from geopolitical power and
prestige (Collins 1999; Johnson & Earle 2000). The other strategy of imperial cohesiveness
was  religious  policy.  The dynamics  of  conversion to imperial  creed (which after  the
demise  of  empires  could  linger  as  the  civilizational  afterglow  – as  in  Western
Christendom  or  the  Islamic  countries)  was  determined  by  the  interplay  of  imperial
strength and the resilience of pre-dating local institutions. In the Ottoman realm, such
institutions could be strong enough to better incorporate them in the structures of rules
as autonomous bodies. In Brazil and Africa (much less so in Macao or India) the relatively
feeble Portuguese rule could still convert the conquered populations into its creed and
language albeit usually in syncretistic forms. On this count, Russia remained somewhere
in  the  middle  – turning  Russian  into  lingua  franca,  which  was  achieved  to  a  very
impressive extent, nonetheless almost never translated into the erasure of non-Russian
identities. The prevalent focus on post-imperial nationalisms obscures the dynamically
complex dualisms of such cultural situations.
 
The Changes in the 20th Century
16 I. In 1914 the core states of capitalist world-system committed a group suicide. The core’s
implosion brought down the Russian and Turkish empires in extremely violent ways. The
Russian state was put back together by the tightly organized party of intelligentsia who
drew their inspiration from German sources – Marx and SPD, but no less from the war
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economy of  general  Ludendorff.  The combination proved so  formidable  that  Russian
empire could be re-established on new foundations for three more generations. Turkey
between 1914 and 1923 was bloodily cut to a national state, whose leadership emerged
from  the  ranks  of  military  intelligentsia  versed  mostly  in  Durkheim  and  French
republicanism. Portugal,  for centuries the safest backwater of Europe, experienced its
share of revolutionary turmoil which after 1928 ended, without much terror, in the long-
lasting reactionary dictatorship. Yet Portugal’s Estado Novo, despite the moves to emulate
the fascist Italy and Germany, neither dared to unleash a fascist movement nor could
gather the requisite organizational capacity. Yet even Portugal obtained in the chaos of
the 1914-1945 hegemonic transition its opportunity to become a fairly autonomous state.
17 II. The paradigmatic anti-imperialist revolts of the 20th century tended to coincide with
the centers of former agrarian empires: Russia, Turkey, Spain, China, India, Iran, or even
Ethiopia.  Evidently,  such  locations  offered  richer  concentrations  of  resources  for
mobilization, including military, and contained the elites who could hope for renewed
greatness if they successfully connect with popular resentments and manage to upgrade
their states.
18 III. Analytically, the twentieth-century socialist and nationalist states can be presented as
partially  overlapping sectors  on the same continuum of  historical  possibilities.  Their
difference is  more in the degree of  state’s  reach than in ideology. When a group of
intelligentsia alienated from economic property managed to transform themselves into
revolutionary regime and used the state power to bring under government’s control all
economic assets down to peasant households, the result was called socialism. When state
power was taken by the alliance of property owners, lesser officials, and intelligentsia in
order to bring under government’s control the economic assets of foreign capitalists and
the particularly ‘unprogressive’ classes like clergy and landlords, the outcome would be
proclaimed national liberation. In both cases the economic assets accumulated by the
newly  reinforced  government  were  put  into  the  expansive  programs  of  capital
investment. The goal was to rapidly reproduce within the state jurisdiction the industries
and education establishment similar to the core Western states. 
19 IV. A successful developmentalist dictatorship, whether communist of nationalist, could
maintain the rapid pace of industrialization for two or three decades. After that comes
the  slow  down  caused  by  the  maturation  of  command  economy,  the  passive  power
obtained  by  its  new  proletarians,  and  the  self-encapsulation  of  mid-ranking
bureaucracies. The USSR, Kemalist Turkey, and Portuguese Estado Novo exemplified three
different paradigms within the same continuum of developmentalist dictatorships. All
three industrialized and achieved significant rates of material accumulation first during
the autarchic 1930s and still more impressive results in the expansive 1950s–1960s. All
three, after industrial spurt, in their own but analytically comparable ways ran into what
Peter Evans (1995) calls the pressures to dismantle the developmental state. Portugal and
the USSR, both under the strain of colonial defeats, democratized in spectacular fashion.
Turkey underwent a series of acute crises which also resulted in the institutionalization
of  competitive  politics.  Portugal  was  the  first  to  completely  abandon  its  imperial
pretensions for the sake of rapid integration into the emergent European supra-state.
Turkey moved in the same direction, but the Russian future seems more problematic. Did
we see the end of imperial trajectories?
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ABSTRACTS
The  revealing  analogies  among  the  Portuguese,  Russian,  and  Turko-Ottoman  empires  add
analytical depth to our understanding of the evolution of modern world-system. The empires
emerged simultaneously  with  capitalism and equally  relied on the  new power  techniques  of
gunpower,  bureaucracy,  state  control  over  trade,  and  official  religion.  Starting  from  the
geopolitical margins of Anatolia, the Pyrenees, or Russian forests, the new empires soon achieved
tremendous territorial gains and wealth. But after their first century of success, these empires
came under the penetrating pressures of emergent capitalist forces (the Netherlands and later
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England).
The empires reacted by selectively adopting the organizational and technological innovations of
capitalism in the bouts  of  Absolutist  reforms under  Peter I,  Pombal,  or  during the Tanzimat
period.  All  three  empires  underwent  another  wave  of modernizing  efforts  through  the
constitutionalist  revolutions  in  1905-1910  that  nonetheless  failed  to  prepare  them  for  the
military catastrophe of 1914. The developmentalist dictatorships of Salazar, Atatürk, and Stalin,
for all their ideological differences, equally sought to strengthen the production bases under the
conditions of state direction and economic autarchy. The global wave of democratic rebellions in
1968 undercut all three versions of developmentalism pushing the bureaucratic and capitalist
elites in all three states to seek the preservation of their positions through European integration
— whose outcome remains to be seen.
La mise en évidence des analogies entre les empires portugais, russe et turc ottoman permet
d’approfondir notre compréhension de l’évolution de l’organisation mondiale contemporaine.
L’émergence des empires s’est faite simultanément à celle du capitalisme, et ils ont reposé de la
même façon sur les nouvelles techniques de pouvoir que sont la force des armes, la bureaucratie,
le contrôle de l’État sur le commerce et la religion officielle. Partant des frontières géopolitiques
de l’Anatolie, des Pyrénées ou des forêts de Russie, les nouveaux empires ont très vite atteint une
expansion territoriale et une richesse considérable. Pourtant, après un premier siècle couronné
de succès, ils ont subi la pression envahissante des puissances capitalistes émergentes (les Pays-
Bas et, plus tard, l’Angleterre).
Ces  empires  ont  réagi  en  adoptant  de  façon  sélective  les  innovations  techniques  et
organisationnelles du capitalisme au moment des réformes absolutistes de Pierre Ier, de Pombal,
ou  pendant  la  période  du  Tanzimat.  Ils  ont  tous  trois  connu  une  autre  vague  d'efforts  de
modernisation à travers les révolutions constitutionnelles de 1905-1910 qui ne les ont pourtant
pas préparés à la catastrophe militaire de 1914. Les dictatures développementalistes de Salazar,
Atatürk, et Staline, malgré toutes leurs différences idéologiques, s’efforçaient de la même façon
de renforcer les  bases  de production dans des conditions de direction de l’État  et  d’autarcie
économique. La vague mondiale de rébellions démocratiques de 1968 a miné ces trois versions du
développementalisme, poussant les élites bureaucratiques et capitalistes dans ces trois États à
chercher à préserver leur position à travers l’intégration européenne ‑ dont le résultat reste à
voir.
O evidenciar  das analogias  entre o império português,  russo e  turco otomano dá uma maior
profundidade analítica à nossa compreensão da evolução do sistema mundial contemporâneo. Os
impérios formaram-se simultaneamente com o capitalismo mas apostando também nos novos
poderes técnicos das armas de fogo, na burocracia, no controlo do estado sobre o comércio, assim
como na religião oficial. Desde as margens geopolíticas de Anatólia, dos Pirenéus, ou das florestas
russas, os novos impérios conquistaram rapidamente um território imenso e tremendas riquezas.
Mas após o seu primeiro século de êxitos, esses impérios foram submetidos à crescente pressão
das forças capitalistas emergentes (os Países Baixos e mais tarde a Inglaterra).
Reagiram adoptando, de forma selectiva, as inovações do capitalismo ao nível da organização e da
tecnologia durante o período das reformas absolutistas sob o comando de Pedro I°, do marquês
de Pombal ou durante o período do Tanzimat. Mais tarde, os três tiveram que suportar outra vaga
de esforços de modernização com as revoluções constitucionais entre 1905-1910, que no entanto
falhou  no  que  diz  respeito  à  preparação  à  catástrofe  militar  de  1914.  As  ditaduras
desenvolvimentistas  de  Salazar,  Atatürk  e  Estaline,  apesar  de  suas  diferenças  ideológicas,
procuraram fortalecer as bases de produção em condição de supervisão do estado e de autarcia
económica. A onda global de revoltas democráticas, em 1968, reduziu o peso dessas três versões
de desenvolvimentismo, ao empurrar as elites burocráticas e capitalistas desses três estados para
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uma  procura  de  preservação  das  suas  posições  através  da  integração  europeia  –  cujas
consequências permanecem por definir.
INDEX
Mots-clés: empire portugais, empire russe, empire turc ottoman, émergence du capitalisme,
Salazar, Atatürk, Staline, développementalisme
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